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1. Introduction 
 
Scientists often use aesthetic values in the evaluation and choice of theories. 
Aesthetic values are not only regarded as leading to practically more useful 
theories, but are often taken to be indicators of the truth of a theory. This paper 
explores what aesthetic considerations influence scientists’ reasoning, how such 
aesthetic values relate to the utility of a scientific theory, and how one can 
justify the epistemic role for such values. The paper examines ways in which the 
link between beauty and truth can be defended, the challenges facing such 
accounts, and explores alternative epistemic roles for aesthetic values in 
scientific practice.  
 
2. Aesthetic Judgment in Science 
 
Aesthetic judgments appear to be part of scientific theorising. Scientists often 
praise hypotheses, proofs, experiments, and theories on their aesthetic merit and 
furthermore place epistemic import on such merit. Some scientists claim that the 
beauty of scientific theories is a driving force of scientific research, suggesting 
that the aim of science is to find beauty in nature. The French mathematician 
Henri Poincaré, for instance, claimed that an aesthetically pleasing theory 
generates in the scientist an aesthetic response for which the intellect has full 
appreciation and actively searches. In Science and Method, Poincaré argues 
that the reason scientists study nature is to experience an aesthetic response by 
appreciating how diverse phenomena are harmoniously accommodated by a 
theory. He claims that “[t]he scientist does not study nature because it is useful 
to do so. He studies it because he takes pleasure in it, and he takes pleasure in it 
because it is beautiful. I am not speaking, of course, of the beauty which strikes 
the senses […] What I mean is that more intimate beauty which comes from the 
harmonious order of its parts, and which pure intelligence can grasp (2001, 
368). 
Aside from this motivational role, beauty is often taken to have a heuristic 
role in scientific activities. Aesthetic values are often appealed to in order to 
resolve the underdetermination of theory by the data, when empirical evidence 
is insufficient to choose between competing theories (Duhem (1954)). In such 
situations, aesthetic values aid theory choice, leading to the adoption of one 
empirically adequate theory over another. Ernst Mach’s (1919) ‘economy of 
thought’ principle is one such methodological application of simplicity as a 
heuristic guide to choosing between empirically equivalent theories.  
In addition to its heuristic and motivational roles, beauty is often taken to 
stand in a special epistemic relationship to truth. Many scientists and 
philosophers have held that a beautiful theory is more likely to be true. Paul 
Dirac famously claimed that “one has a great confidence in [a] theory arising 
from its great beauty, quite independently of its detailed successes” (Dirac 1980, 
40). Dirac takes beauty to be linked to truth, such that we can be confident in 
the truth of a beautiful theory independently of its empirical adequacy. He 
claims that “[o]ne has an overpowering belief that [the theory’s] foundations 
must be correct quite independently of its agreement with observation” (ibid.). 
Werner Heisenberg also defended the intrinsic relationship between truth and 
beauty: “[i]f nature leads us to mathematical forms of great simplicity and 
beauty we cannot help thinking that they are “true”, that they reveal a genuine 
feature of nature” (Heisenberg 1971, p. 68). James Watson (1968) suggests that 
what convinced Rosalind Franklin, who had already considered the double 
helix structure of DNA but believed some of the x-ray pictures she had 
produced gave evidence against it, was the fact that the double helix structure 
of DNA was too beautiful not to be true (Watson 1968, p. 124). The Nobel 
laureate Subrahmanyan Chandrasekhar similarly held that it is reasonable to 
believe that “a theory developed by a scientist, with an exceptionally well-
developed aesthetic sensibility, can turn out to be true even if, at the time of its 
formulation, it appeared not to be so” (1987, 64). 
Aesthetics has come into science not only because scientists often employ 
aesthetic values in their decision-making, but furthermore, because sometimes 
the very product of science or the process of discovery has been regarded as a 
work of art. Some scientists regard the product of their intellectual activities, 
whether scientific theories, models, or mathematical proofs, as works of art. For 
example, the French physicist Pierre Duhem claimed that “it is impossible to 
follow the march of one of the great theories of physics, to see it unroll 
majestically its regular deductions starting from initial hypotheses, to see its 
consequences represent a multitude of experimental laws down to the small 
detail, without being charmed by the beauty of such a construction, without 
feeling keenly that such a creation of the human mind is truly a work of art” 
(Duhem 1954, 24). Furthermore, Ernest Rutherford claimed that theories can be 
conceived as artistic productions: “a strong claim can be made that the process 
of scientific discovery may be regarded as a form of art. This is best seen in the 
theoretical aspect of Physical Science. The mathematical theorist builds up on 
certain assumptions and according to well understood logical rules, step by 
step, a stately edifice, whilst imaginative power brings out clearly the hidden 
relations between its parts. A well constructed theory is in some respects 
undoubtedly an artistic production.” [quoted in McAllister 1996, 14]  
Apart from appraising theories on their aesthetic appeal, scientists very often 
discuss the role of their aesthetic sensibility and their ability to select useful 
theories based on this sensibility. Poincaré, for example, argues that when a 
mathematician is generating potential hypotheses and proofs, the aesthetic 
sensibility “plays the part of the delicate sieve” which checks the result blindly 
generated by the mind and selects only the most elegant and beautiful 
combinations produced (2001, 397). He links the aesthetic sensibility with the 
utility of the proof, claiming that “[t]he useful combinations are precisely the 
most beautiful” (ibid.) 1 . Similarly, John von Neumann held that “a 																																																								1	Poincaré’s interesting account of creativity in mathematics and science is analysed in 
Livingston (2009). 	
mathematician’s criteria of success, and also those of truth, are mainly 
aesthetic” (von Neumann 1961, 2062). When discussing the problem of 
underdetermination, Duhem employs a concept of ‘good sense’ in order to 
explain how scientists come to an agreement about the aesthetic properties of 
theories. Just like David Hume, Duhem appeals to the good sense of scientists 
who can appreciate the aesthetic properties of theories in an unbiased and 
impartial way and reach a conclusive choice (Duhem 1954, 218). For Duhem, 
it is good sense that ensures that despite the subjective nature of aesthetic 
judgments, scientists with good sense can come to an objective agreement 
about the aesthetic merit of theories (Stump (2007), Ivanova (2010, 2014, 
2015)).   
Aesthetics has come into philosophy of science also with the recent focus on 
the concept of scientific representation. The subject of scientific representation 
and its relation to representation in art has generated considerable debate in the 
recent literature, especially since the rise of the semantic approach to scientific 
theories (Chakravartty (2007), French (2003, 2014), Frigg and Hunter (2010) van 
Fraassen (2008)). Some have even taken science to be a representational art. 
Kivy (1991), for example, argues that appreciating a theory epistemically and 
aesthetically is interrelated insofar as one cannot appreciate the theory’s 
representational success without appreciating its aesthetic value as well.  
While plenty of scientists attribute a genuine epistemic role to aesthetic 
judgments, scepticism has also developed towards this claim. An alternative 
view is that aesthetic language used by scientists is reducible to, or a 
manifestation of, statements about the empirical adequacy of a theory. On this 
account, when a scientist is attributing aesthetic value to a theory, they are 
simply using a different language to state that the theory is empirically adequate. 
To question any substantial role for aesthetic judgements in science one can 
appeal to the traditional distinction between the context of discovery and the 
context of justification (originally drawn by Reichenbach (1947)) and claim that 
aesthetic factors, understood as subjective factors, are only relevant in the 
context of discovery. The context of justification, on the other hand, is seen as a 
rational process involving only objective factors, and so aesthetic values have 
no place in this context. This distinction, however, has been questioned on the 
grounds that aesthetic considerations figure in both contexts. As Cellucci (2014) 
argues, beauty plays an important role in both contexts, since it guides the 
selection of hypotheses in the development of a theory. A further problem for 
reducing aesthetic language to statements about empirical adequacy is that 
aesthetic factors are often the only factors available in decision-making, such as 
when a theory has yet to obtain empirical support. Aesthetic values often drive 
the preference of one theory over another in the case of underdetermination, 
and moreover they are appealed to in order to provide evidential support in 
cases where empirical confirmation for a theory has not been obtained. This is 
notable in the case of string theory and cosmological theories, where appeal to 
aesthetic considerations in support of a theory is crucial in the absence of 
empirical data.  
Scepticism towards the status of aesthetic judgments in science has also 
been developed on the grounds that it is difficult to define exactly what 
constitutes an aesthetic response. McAllister (1996) appeals to the notion of 
aptness in conjunction with taking scientists’ aesthetic claims literally, although 
this idea has been subject to criticism (Todd (2008), Montano (2014)). Is it 
argued that without a satisfactory account defining what constitutes an aesthetic 
response, we have no grounds to infer that the claims scientists make about the 
beauty of theories are of a genuinely aesthetic nature. Todd (2008) argues that 
without such conditions, it is difficult to see why the properties generally 
regarded as aesthetic are anything but epistemic in nature.  
An interesting insight into the nature of aesthetic claims in science comes 
from recent studies in neuropsychology that demonstrate the appreciation of 
mathematical equations to correspond to the same brain activity as aesthetic 
appreciation of music and art. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging to 
detect brain activity, Zeki et al. (2014) show that the same areas of the brain are 
active when a mathematician is exposed to equations they have previously 
described as beautiful as when they are appreciating pieces of art and music. In 
the study Zeki et al. report that “the experience of mathematical beauty 
correlates with activity in the same brain area [medial orbito-frontal cortex] 
active during the experience of visual, musical, and moral beauty” (Zeki et al. 
2014, 8). While these studies do not directly address the sceptical worries 
discussed above, they do give important insight into the mechanisms that allow 
us to experience beauty, and show that scientists are indeed reporting an 
aesthetic experience when praising theories or proofs as beautiful. In the next 
sections, we engage with the concept of beauty employed in science (sec. 3), 
discuss how scientists come to regard some features of a theory as aesthetically 
appealing (sec. 4), and address the role and justification of aesthetic 
considerations in scientific reasoning (sec. 5).  
 
3. Beauty and Aesthetic Values 
 
When it comes to the concept of beauty, one question that has traditionally 
puzzled philosophers is whether beauty is an objective property of theories or 
whether it is projected onto theories by us. Objectivists argue that works of art 
deemed aesthetically valuable in the past, such as Leonardo da Vinci’s paintings 
and Homer’s poems, continue to be valued today, making aesthetic judgements 
bear eternal validity rather than being subject to change and fashion. 
Projectivists, on the other hand, argue that beauty is a dynamic concept, and 
what is considered beautiful today might not be considered beautiful tomorrow. 
Some scientists claim that even if the concept of beauty is allowed to change in 
the arts, aesthetic judgments in science have objective and universal validity 
(Zee (1999), Greene (1999) and Thuan (2001)). These authors claim that values 
such as simplicity, symmetry, and elegance are not subject to revision in 
science and are universally recognised as beautiful. Similarly, Dirac claimed 
that while aesthetic judgments in art very much depend upon contingent factors 
such as culture and upbringing, beauty in mathematics exhibits objective and 
universal validity (Dyson 1987). 
While some scientists claim that the concept of beauty cannot be 
analysed, many give an insight into the way they understand the concept, by 
reducing it to certain aesthetic properties like simplicity, symmetry, harmony or 
unity (the concept of beauty is systematically analysed in Engler (2002), 
McAllister (1996), Breitenbach (2013), de Regt (2002), Gaut and Lopez (2013), 
Cellucci (2014)). One question that arises is whether these aesthetic values can 
be regarded as universally accepted. Some claim that aesthetic properties 
associated with beauty can differ in time and can also be understood differently 
across the disciplines or even within the same discipline by different groups of 
scientists. As Duhem (1954) argues, aesthetic values such as simplicity and 
elegance “are essentially subjective, contingent, and variable with time, with 
schools, and with persons” (p. 288). McAllister shares this conviction, pointing 
to numerous examples from the history of science where the forms of aesthetic 
appreciation changed through theory transitions. He claims that visualisation, 
for example, stopped being aesthetically valued with the development of 
quantum mechanics, while the desire for symmetry became especially 
important after the advent of relativity theory (McAllister 1996). McAllister 
defends a ‘dynamic’ conception of beauty, according to which aesthetic 
properties associated with beauty can change and be replaced. Furthermore, 
McAllister holds that even at a particular time scientists have the freedom to 
understand each property in different ways.  
A further worry for the objectivist account comes from the observation 
that aesthetic properties associated with beauty might differ across the fields. 
One insight comes from biology, where complexity and irregularity are often 
praised and regarded as more desirable than simplicity and regularity. As the 
biologist Stephen Jay Gould argued, we can find beauty in simple mathematical 
principles as well as in unrepeatable complex contingencies. Whereas the idea 
of complexity and irregularity being aesthetically valuable stems from the 
background assumption that complexity in the biological world increases with 
time, this claim has recently been questioned by O'Malley, Wideman and Ruiz-
Trillo (2016) who argue that simplification, understood as the reduction of 
biological complexity at different levels, occurs across the tree of life, and is 
responsible for diversification through the reduction of parts and even losses of 
hierarchical complexity.  
The latter worry brings to attention the importance of the context in 
which aesthetic judgments are made. For example, different aesthetic values 
can be desirable in the context of (1) developing a theory and (2) studying 
phenomena. Desire for complexity in the phenomena can indeed be found in 
physics, where symmetry breaking is considered beautiful exactly because it 
helps to further our knowledge. Desire for theories with a high number of 
symmetries, however, remains something of an imperative in modern physics 
widely adopted in the discipline.  
Lastly, note that many scientific objects might be aesthetically praised. 
Although when discussing the concept of truth or utility it is standard to focus 
on the aesthetic properties of scientific theories, it is important to note that 
scientists praise many objects as aesthetically valuable; e.g. mathematical 
proofs, scientific discoveries, scientific experiments, observations and models. 
The concept of mathematical beauty, and the question of how mathematics 
applies to physics, has received systematic attention in the literature (Cellucci 
(2015), Engler (1990), McAllister (2005), Montano (2013)). Systematic analysis 
has also been given to the aesthetic value of experiments in physics and biology 
and their epistemic role (Holmes (1996, 2001), Parsons and Reuger (2000), 
Reuger (1997)).   
 
4. Truth and Beauty 
 
Aesthetic judgements are widely employed in scientific practise, but can they 
play a substantial epistemic role? Can we justify the claim, so often made by 
scientists, that beauty is indicative of truth? According to James McAllister 
(1996), aesthetic values can justify one’s confidence in a theory even if the 
theory has not received sufficient empirical support. The reliability of such 
values is supported by appealing to the established aesthetic canon, based on 
the aesthetic properties of the most empirically successful theories of the past. 
The argument relies on a mechanism known in the psychology literature as the 
‘exposure effect’. Studies performed on subjects have found that an agent’s 
aesthetic preference towards an object tends to increase the more the agent is 
exposed to the object (Cutting (2003)). McAllister claims that scientists learn 
from their experience, by habituation or exposure, what aesthetic values have 
been associated with successful theories, and they project an expectation that 
such values will continue to be properties of successful theories, taking such 
theories to be true. The justification for the link between beauty and truth is 
based on an aesthetic induction – we infer that a theory conforming to the 
established aesthetic cannon is more likely to be empirically successful or true.2  
McAllister offers a reductionist account of beauty by analysing beauty in 
terms of simplicity, symmetry, harmony, visualisation and elegance. He 
employs a dynamical notion of beauty in order to allow for aesthetic values to 
change with scientific progress. McAllister takes aesthetic discontinuities to 
occur in theory transitions, and claims that what drives the revision of an 
aesthetic canon is ultimately the empirical success of the superseding theory. An 
analogy is drawn with the history of architecture, where we find similar increase 
of aesthetic appreciation of certain structures only after the utility of the new 
materials used for their design has been fully appreciated and utilised. Notable 
examples of architectural icons that initially received negative aesthetic praise 
include the Eiffel Tower and St Pancras Station, whose aesthetic value increased 
with the appreciation of their practical utility. One might object to the claim 
that aesthetic values can be useful predictors of success by appealing to 
examples of aesthetically appealing theories that turned out to be false (e.g. 
Newtonian mechanics; Kaluza-Klein theory), or contemporary empirically 
successful theories that are not widely considered to have strong aesthetic merit 
(e.g. the Standard Model of particle physics). 
 While a dynamic conception of beauty aims at blocking worries about 
aesthetic discontinuities in theory change, some argue that certain aesthetic 
values have been persistently desired and associated with the ideal end of 
science, independently of whether they have been continuously exemplified by 
empirically successful theories of the past. For instance, Montano (2014) argues 
that values such as simplicity and unity have been ‘historical constants’, not 
subjected to change or fashion. It seems plausible that certain aesthetic values 
have remained highly desirable despite not being instantiated by highly 																																																								2	A further defence of the link between beauty and truth is given in Kuipers (2002) and Montano 
(2014).	
successful contemporary theories. Also, contrary to the exposure effect, some 
properties have failed to gain aesthetic appeal despite being instantiated by 
highly successful theories. For example, exposure to the Standard Model’s 
enormous empirical success, or the success of computer-assisted proofs in 
mathematics, has not resulted in an increased appreciation of complexity over 
simplicity in scientific theories. The fact that scientists aim to develop grand 
unifying theories shows that unity and simplicity continue to be highly 
appreciated independently of the limited successes of contemporary 
unificationist projects.  
 The claim that we learn to appreciate certain aesthetic properties of 
successful theories by habituation is also challenged by recent studies on the 
exposure effect in aesthetics that, I suggest, shed doubt on the claim that 
exposure is sufficient for an agent’s increased aesthetic appreciation. Consider 
the recent studies on the exposure effect in art conducted by Meskin, Phelan, 
Moore and Kieran (2013). These studies show that exposure to ‘bad’ art does 
not correlate with increase in subjects’ aesthetic appreciation, suggesting that 
something over and above exposure must be responsible for subject’s aesthetic 
responses to art pieces. By considering these results in the context of science, 
we have grounds to challenge the idea that exposure and habituation are 
responsible or sufficient for scientists’ appreciation of the aesthetic values of 
scientific theories. This problem calls for the further examination of the 
exposure effect in order to understand why some aesthetic values, such as 
simplicity and unity, remain the ultimate aims of science independently of 
whether scientists have had systematic exposure to successful theories 
exemplifying these values. 
 
5. Aesthetic Values and Understanding 
 
Further to the relationship between aesthetic values and truth, some 
philosophers have explored an alternative epistemic role for aesthetic values in 
science. Rather than taking aesthetic values to be indicators of the truth of a 
theory, aesthetic values can be taken to be indicative of scientific 
understanding. The unificationist project, initially developed by Friedman 
(1974) and Kitcher (1981) offered an analysis of how unification can lead to 
understanding. Some philosophers are now exploring whether the aesthetic 
responses of scientists are simply an aspect of gaining understanding, and how 
aesthetic experience and experience of understanding are related. Elgin (1991) 
also draws important analogies between understanding in art and science.  
 Recent accounts of understanding maintain that understanding differs 
from knowing; it involves an ability to grasp how the facts fit together3. As 
Thomas Kuhn (1970) notes, there is a difference between reciting relevant laws 
and principles, and understanding how to apply these laws and principles (p. 
23). The ability to see how certain truths relate to each other and apply them to 
different contexts is considered an essential element of understanding. Truth, 
however, on this account, is not a requirement for understanding (Elgin (2009), 
Mizrahi (2012), de Regt (2004), Toon (2015), Strevens (2013)). As Henk de Regt 
(2015) argues, if truth is a necessary condition for understanding, we are led to 
the claim that past scientists have lacked understanding of phenomena for 
which they had advanced empirically successful, but from our perspective false, 
theories. To avoid this objection, de Regt argues that understanding does not 
require truth, but rather an ability to manipulate and use a theory within a 
certain domain.  
 Linking understanding to the idea of comprehending relations or 
connections immediately raises the question of whether values such as 
coherence, unity and simplicity are related to the concept of understanding. 
This link has been explicitly made, with Peter Kosso (2002) arguing that 
aesthetic values serve as conditions for understanding, and more recently, 
Angela Breitenbach (2013) arguing that aesthetic values play an epistemic role 
in science exactly because they aid understanding. According to Breitenbach’s 
account, scientists appeal to aesthetic considerations not because the 
phenomena themselves instantiate aesthetic properties, but because in aiming to 
develop simple, unified, elegant theories, scientists develop theories that 																																																								
3 This account of understanding is not uncontroversial; Kitcher (2002), Lipton (2004), Grimm 
(2006) and Bird (2007) take understanding to be a kind of knowledge.  
provide understanding. This neo-Kantian approach takes aesthetic judgments to 
be not about objective features of the world, but rather about our own 
reflections on the objects of our experience. Aesthetic judgments, however, are 
not taken to be purely subjective, since they demand the agreement of other 
agents and thus have intersubjective validity. Additionally, as argued in Ivanova 
(2016), an interesting link between understanding and aesthetic values can be 
found in Poincaré’s take on the aim of science. According to this account, the 
aim of science is not truth, but rather an understanding of how phenomena are 
related, and aesthetic values such as simplicity and unity are regulative ideals 
linked to this ultimate aim of science; they lead to an understanding of the 
relations that hold between phenomena. For Poincaré, beauty is experienced 
when one has grasped how different and apparently disconnected phenomena 
are unified. Poincaré reduces beauty to the simplicity, harmony and unity of 
theories; he argues that these values persist as ideals of science rather than 
being subject to time and fashion, and are conditions of thinking. These 
accounts are instructive in overcoming many of the objections noted above 
regarding the link between aesthetic values and truth, and in establishing the 
epistemic role of aesthetic values.  
 
6. Conclusion 
 
It remains fascinating that decision-making in science is influenced by aesthetic 
factors, and it is often maintained that aesthetic values in science have timeless, 
objective validity. While scientists can be skeptical towards the objective 
validity of aesthetic judgments, such judgments are persistently employed in 
practical reasoning. Although the link between beauty and truth is hard to 
justify, as is the idea that beauty can be predictive of empirical success, it 
remains an open question why explanations are valued for their aesthetic merit, 
and why we actively search for symmetry, simplicity, and unity in nature and in 
our representations of the world. 
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